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In federal industrial law, the scope of a conciliated agreement, it seems, is not circumscribed 
by the notion, peculiar to arbitration, of the ambit of an industrial dispute.  This paper presents 
a personal view about several questions, without offering what should be taken to be a 
considered answer to any of them.  Those questions are: 
 
- Does a notion akin to ambit impose limits on the permissible content of a “private 
arbitration” under section 170LW of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the WR Act) 
between parties to an agreement over the application of it? 
- Is there any significant difference in such ambit if the permissible content of the 
agreement being applied must pertain to the workplace relationship rather than a 
generic employment relationship? 
- Is a procedure for discussion of disputes still a procedure for preventing and settling 
disputes arising under an agreement? 
- Is provision for the empowerment of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
by certified agreement under section 170LW a matter of art? 
- Should the requirement in section 170LW for the Commission to approve an 
empowerment of it be seen as requiring a substantive examination of whether an 
agreement does one, the other, both or none of the empowerments? 
- Does private arbitration under an agreed section 170LW procedure allow 
adjudications upon legal rights and liabilities arising under the agreement in a manner 
not confined by board of reference case law precedents? 
- Does the “new” province for private arbitration reflect a potential for recognising that 
industrial tribunals offer a cost effective alternative to court based litigation? 
 
An idea floated by a seminal article in The Irish Jurist should be acknowledged as a germinal 
factor in the High Court’s recent resuscitation of the dispute settling power in section 170MH 
of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (the IR Act).  In a 1976 paper, McCormack discussed 
procedures for the settlement of disputes in primitive societies.  He instanced approvingly a 
conciliator settling a dispute about a horse by an agreement about a cow1.  In 1984 a majority 
of the High Court in R v Bain; Ex parte Bain v Cadbury Schweppes2 accepted that, for 
purposes of the exercise of award making powers, the ambit of an industrial dispute may be 
enlarged or contracted as a result of interactions between the industrial disputants3.  All 
judgments proceeded from the unassailable proposition that the notion of ambit is a 
                                                 
1 See, e.g. G. McCormack, “Procedures For The Settlement of Disputes in ‘Simple’ Societies”, The Irish Jurist, 
Vol. 11 (1976), 175. 
2 (1984) 159 CLR 163. 
3 Ibid Bain v Cadbury Schweppes at 168 per Murphy J with whom Brennan and Deane JJ agreed at 175. 
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foundational condition for exercise of arbitral function by adjudication upon the matter of a 
dispute submitted4. 
 
However, some members of the court ventured beyond the bounds of the doctrine of industrial 
dispute ambit.  Brennan and Deane JJ, who with Murphy J constituted the majority, cited 
McCormack’s article.  They pointed to the flexibility and sophistication exhibited even by the 
conciliation processes of primitive societies demonstrated by McCormack.  The reference 
reinforced a point against applying to conciliation the ambit of dispute doctrine derived from 
the nature of arbitration.  That notion constitutes a parameter of industrial arbitration.  But 
conciliation is not the same thing as arbitration.  They suggested the constitutional head of 
power in relation to the prevention of industrial disputes by conciliation might be a more 
potent source for legislation than the corresponding power relating to arbitration5.  That dicta 
encouraged beliefs that the Commission could be empowered to settle disputes under a 
process agreed by parties as an outcome of conciliation. 
 
In 1993, a Full Bench of the Commission in Co-operative Bulk Handling pronounced upon 
the validity of an award dispute settlement procedure inserted many years earlier into the 
award by a consent variation6.  The principle implied in dicta from Bain v Cadbury 
Schweppes was a major element in the Full Bench’s analysis.  The majority decision 
discussed the history and material jurisprudence of dispute settlement procedures in awards.  
The relevant award clause in issue contained a reference to “arbitration”.  The Full Bench 
read down that expression.  Commission action to “arbitrate” a dispute referred to it under the 
provision could not go beyond giving a decision in circumstances where the Commission had 
                                                 
4 Ibid Bain v Cadbury Schweppes at 173 per Wilson and Dawson JJ citing R v Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow and Company (No. 2) (1910) 11 CLR 1.  But see especially 
Issacs J at 61-62. 
5 Ibid Bain v Cadbury Schweppes at 176: 
 
 “... the ambit of the dispute determines the limits of the jurisdiction of an arbitrator to bind the parties by 
his award.  Those limits are derived from the nature of arbitration; they do not circumscribe the functions 
of a conciliator who is at liberty to assist the parties themselves to avoid or settle a dispute by an 
agreement which ventures beyond the ambit of their prospective or actual dispute.  If the functions of an 
industrial conciliator were circumscribed by the ambit of a prospective or actual dispute, they would lack 
the flexibility and sophistication exhibited even by the conciliation processes of primitive tribal societies 
(see, e.g. G. McCormack, “Procedures For the Settlement of Disputes in ‘Simple’ Societies”, The Irish 
Jurist, vol. 11 (1976), 175; Roberts, Order and Dispute (1979), pp. 68-69).  The decisions of this Court in 
which the limits of arbitral power have been stated by reference to the ambit of disputes may be given too 
wide a significance if they are assumed to state in the same way the scope of the legislative power with 
respect to conciliation under s. 51(xxxv) of the Constitution or the scope of the conciliation powers of the 
Commission under the Act ...” 
6 Co-Operative Bulk Handling Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (1993) 47 IR 361. 
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been satisfied the decision would be accepted by each party7.  That departure from the 
ordinary meaning of the words used in the relevant clause applied reasoning in Portus8, to the 
effect that the Commission, a creature of statute, could not exercise a function in the absence 
of an express power in the Act9. 
 
The absence of an effective link between dispute settlement procedures and a statutory 
empowerment of the Commission was addressed by the Industrial Relations Reform Act of 
1993.  The relevant passage of the Explanatory Memorandum seemed to disclose diffidence 
about the innovation, noting that it would be for the Commission to approve whatever role 
was proposed for it in a dispute settling procedure as appropriate10.  The policy appears to 
have been intended to allow the parties to an agreement to “propose” a role for the 
Commission, leaving the Commission with a discretion when certifying the agreement to 
approve, or not approve that role. 
 
Be that as it may, with effect from March 1994, section 170MH of the IR Act provided in 
relation to dispute settlement provisions in certified agreements: 
 
“170MH Procedures for preventing and settling disputes 
 
Procedures in an agreement for preventing and settling disputes between employers and 
employees covered by the agreement may, if the Commission so approves, empower the 
Commission to do either or both of the following: 
 
(a) to settle disputes over the application of the agreement; 
(b) to appoint a board of reference as described in section 131 for the purpose of 
settling such disputes.” 
 
                                                 
7 Ibid Co-Op Bulk Handling at 382. 
8 Re Portus; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group (1972) 127 CLR 353 at 360. 
9 Ibid Co-Op Bulk Handling at 386. 
10 The introduction of the new provision in the Explanatory Memorandum circulated for the First Reading of the 
Industrial Relations Reform Bill 1993 was no model of coherence or the plain English promoted by that 
legislation: 
 
  “Section 170MG:  Procedures for preventing and settling disputes: 
 
 This section complements proposed paragraph 170MC(1)(c) which gives the Commission power to settle 
disputes over the application of the agreement or which allow the Commission to appoint a board of 
reference to settle such disputes (the establishment of boards of reference is covered by section 31 of the 
Principal Act). 
 
 The Commission will have a discretion as to whether it will allow the inclusion of these terms in an 
agreement.  The Commission might take the view that disputes settling procedures contained in the 
agreement propose a role for the Commission which was inappropriate.”  [Industrial Relations Reform 
Bill 1993:  Explanatory Memorandum Parliamentary Paper 51513 Cat. No. 93 4413.] 
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In 1996 section 170MH was re-enacted, with a minor change, as section 170LW of the 
Workplace Relations Act11. 
 
In mid 1997, in CFMEU v Gordonstone Coal Management12 a Full Bench of the Commission 
construed and applied section 170MH of the IR Act13.  An agreement certified under the 
former Act contained a Problem Resolution Procedure, (the PRP), which provided: 
 
“21. PROBLEM RESOLUTION PROCEDURE 
 
(a) In the event of a safety or industrial issue arising, the parties agree to aim to 
resolve such conflict responsibly and harmoniously and as quickly as possible on 
site. 
(b) ... 
(c) ... 
(d) ... 
 
22. AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 
 
(a) In the event of a dispute where resolution cannot be achieved without the 
assistance of the AIRC, the parties will exchange positions prior to any hearing 
taking place. 
(b) The parties to this Agreement agree to abide by any decision determined by the 
AIRC which relates to a dispute at Gordonstone Mine. 
(c) Where it is agreed by the parties to resolve the matter with a mediator of the 
AIRC, both parties agree to abide by the recommendation of the chairman.”. 
 
The Full Bench relied upon the observations in Bain v Cadbury Schweppes as a basis for 
holding that section 170MH could validly empower the Commission to hear and determine 
                                                 
11 Section 170LW substitutes the words “employees whose employment will be subject to the agreement” for the 
words “employees covered by the agreement”.  A requirement in s.170LT(8) for all certified agreements to 
include procedures for preventing and settling disputes between the employer and such employees about 
matters arising under the agreement corresponds in much the same way to s.170MC(1)(c) of the IR Act.  The 
Explanatory Memorandum for the 1996 Bill explained the revised provision as follows: 
 
 “New section 170LW - Procedures for preventing and settling disputes 
 
 9.109. Agreements must contain procedures for preventing and settling disputes about matters arising 
under the agreement [new subsection 170LT(7)].  New section 170LW provides specified means by 
which this requirement may be satisfied. 
 
 9.110. This provision provides that a certified agreement may, if the Commission approves, empower the 
Commission to settle disputes over the application of the agreement and/or appoint a board of reference 
for the purpose of settling such disputes.  [Boards of reference are provided for by section 131 of the Act.] 
 
 9.111. An agreement is not required to contain either mechanism, but may contain either or both.”  [The 
Parliament of the Commonwealth Australia, House of Representatives:  Workplace Relations and Other 
Legislation Amendment Bill 1996, Explanatory Memorandum: 77708 Cat. No. 96 4511X ISBN 0644 
445688 at 75.] 
12 CFMEU v Gordonstone Coal Management Pty Ltd  [1997] 75 IR 249. 
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disputes over the application of the agreement.  The substance of the AIRC Full Bench’s 
reasoning on that point was set aside on judicial review by a Full Court of the Federal Court14.  
However, the Full Court’s judgment did not address the contention that section 170MH had a 
distinct constitutional basis.  Rather, the Full Court held that the PRP provisions served to 
enliven the power in section 170MH in a way that came within the principles applied in Re 
Hegarty; Ex parte City of Salisbury15.  A key point in the Full Court’s reasoning was to 
construe Part VIB of the former Act, in which section 170MH appeared in its statutory 
context.  The Full Court read it, and its successor in the current Act, as subject to the 
restrictions in Part VI of the current Act on use of arbitration powers.  Perhaps for that 
reason, no attention was given to the substantial judicial and legislative moss that had 
accumulated on the rolling stone set loose in Bain v Cadbury Schweppes.  That line of 
authority and reasoning was not mentioned at all in the joint judgment of the Full Court. 
 
On appeal, in a unanimous decision, the High Court addressed a primary question of whether 
section 170MH was validly made, held that it was, and reversed the Full Court decision.  The 
Industrial Relations Act Case16 was relied upon for the proposition that it is incidental to the 
conciliation and arbitration power for the Parliament to permit parties to an industrial dispute 
to agree on the terms on which they will settle the matters in issue conditional upon their 
agreement having the same legal effect as an award.  Bain v Cadbury Schweppes was not 
directly cited, but a reference to it can be found in passages from the Industrial Relations Act 
Case17 by the Court. 
 
Three points relevant to this paper are established by the decision in CFMEU v AIRC18.  The 
first is that section 170MH of the IR Act is a validly enacted authorisation of the Commission 
to participate in procedures for the resolution of disputes over the application of an 
agreement.  Thus: 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid CFMEU v Gordonstone at 261. 
14 Gordonstone Coal Management Pty Ltd v AIRC (1999) FCA 298 per Black CJ, Heerey and Goldberg JJ. 
15 (1981) 147 CLR 617 at 629-630. 
16 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
17 Ibid Victoria v Commonwealth at 536 - 537, per Brennan CJ; Toohey, Gaudron McHugh & Gummow JJ; cited 
CFMEU v AIRC ibid at 68 - 69. 
18 CFMEU v AIRC (2001) 178 ALR 61.  The decision also confirms that an award of costs will be made in 
respect of a proceeding for the constitutional writ of prohibition.  Gageler SC in a recent address suggested 
that that aspect of the decision reflected the adoption of a principle that the duty of a member of the AIRC as 
an officer of the Commonwealth to act in conformity with the WR Act arises from Chapter III Section 75 of 
the Constitution, and rather than from the WR Act. 
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“To the extent that s 170MH of the IR Act (or, presumably section 170LW of the Act) 
operates in conjunction with an agreed dispute resolution procedure to authorise the 
Commission to make decisions as to the legal rights and liabilities of the parties to the 
Agreement, it merely authorises the Commission to exercise a power of private 
arbitration.  And procedures for the resolution of disputes over the application of an 
agreement made by parties to an industrial situation to prevent that situation from 
developing into an industrial dispute are clearly procedures for maintaining that 
agreement.  Parliament may legislate to authorise the Commission to participate in 
procedures of that kind.  Accordingly, s 170MH of the IR Act is valid.”19 
 
The second is that empowerment of the Commission to settle disputes over the application of 
the agreement confers on the Commission a power of private arbitration.  The Court’s 
reasoning to that effect proceeded from the premise that a power to make a binding 
determination as to legal rights and liabilities arising under an award or agreement is, of its 
nature, judicial power.  The Commission could not by arbitrated award give itself such power, 
or any other power that it is not authorised to exercise.  The further premise was that different 
considerations apply: 
 
“if the parties have agreed to submit disputes as to their legal rights and liabilities for 
resolution by a particular person or body and to accept the decision of that person as 
binding on them. 
 
Where parties agree to submit their differences for decision by a third party, the 
decision-maker does not exercise judicial power, but a power of private arbitration.  Of 
its nature, judicial power is a power that is exercised independently of the consent of 
the person against whom the proceedings are brought and results in a judgment or 
order that is binding of its own force.  In the case of private arbitration, however, the 
arbitrator’s powers depend on the agreement of the parties, usually embodied in a 
contract, and the arbitrator’s award is not binding of its own force.  Rather, its effect, if 
any, depends on the law which operates with respect to it.”20 
 
The third point was an acknowledgement of possible general law effects of a certified 
agreement collateral to its operation as an instrument akin to an award: 
 
“The parties to an industrial situation are free to agree between themselves as to the 
terms on which they will conduct their affairs.  Their agreement has effect according to 
the general law.  If their agreement is certified, it also has effect as an award.  To the 
extent that an agreement provides in a manner that exceeds what is permitted either by 
the Constitution or by the legislation which gives the agreement effect as an award, it 
cannot operate with that effect.  But the underlying agreement remains and the validity 
of that agreement depends on the general law, not the legislative provisions which give 
it effect as an award. 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid CFMEU v AIRC at paragraph 32. 
20 Ibid CFMEU v AIRC at paragraphs 30-31. 
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It was not suggested that the general law operates to render cll 21 and 22 of the 
agreement wholly invalid.  Nor does s 170MH proceed on the basis that an agreed 
dispute resolution procedure is valid only if it is confined to disputes over the 
application of an agreement.  That being so, there is no reason why cll 21 and 22 
should not operate so far as it is concerned with disputes of that kind. ...”21 
 
On the reasoning of the Court as to the validity of section 170MH of the former Act, it 
follows that, so far as it relates to Part VIB Division 3 agreements made in settlement of 
industrial disputes, section 170LW of the WR Act would also be validly enacted.  However, 
section 170LW is sustainable also as an authorisation of the Commission to participate in 
procedures for the resolution of disputes over the application of an agreement made under 
Part VIB Division 2.  That distinct class of agreements is comprised of agreements between 
an eligible employer, including a constitutional corporation, and an organisation of employees 
or persons whose employment will be subject to the agreement22. 
 
Sections 170LJ, 170LK and 170LL stipulate the procedural conditions for making agreements 
of the nature described in section 170LI.  The eligible employer for purposes of Part VIB 
Division 2 may be a constitutional corporation, the Commonwealth, an employer in Victoria 
and/or the Territories, a maritime or a flight crew employer23.  In relation to the most prolific 
of the employers in that variegated class, constitutional corporations, a Full Court of the 
Federal Court has held that the provisions of Division 2: 
 
“give binding effect to agreements made between such corporations and organisations of 
employees where such agreements are certified by the Commission.  They also purport 
to bind by such agreements all persons whose employment is, at any time when the 
agreement is in operation, subject to the agreement.  The laws create rights and 
liabilities between the constitutional corporations to which they apply, the 
organisations of employees with whom they conclude certified agreements and the 
employees to whom the agreements apply.  The nature of the agreements is defined in s. 
170LI which describes them as agreements: 
 
‘about matters pertaining to the relationship between ... an employer who is a 
constitutional corporation and ... all persons who, at any time when the 
agreement is in operation, are employed in a single business or a part of a single 
business of the employer and whose employment is subject to the agreement.’ 
 
These elements, made essential by s. 170LI, are sufficient to indicate that the impugned 
laws apply directly to constitutional corporations in that character and to their 
employees. ... The fact that the subject of the law is not itself unique does not deprive it 
                                                 
21 Ibid CFMEU v AIRC at paragraphs 34 and 35. 
22 Section 170LI, to the requirements of which in context are outlined in Webforge Australia Pty Ltd and AMWU 
Print PR914387. 
23 Sections 170LI, 5AA and 494. 
 Page 9 
 
of the character of a law with respect to constitutional corporations if it is specifically 
and uniquely directed to them.  That direction is no mere peg or reference point.  The 
constitutional corporation in Part VIB is a necessary party to the agreement for which 
that Part provides and a necessary repository of the rights and duties which they 
define. ...”24 
 
I have pointed to the diversity of the group of employers associated with the plural 
constitutional bases for agreements certified under Part VIB Division 2.  That difference in 
the legal character of the employer as a party to an agreement may be of some relevance in 
any determination of whether the nature of the agreement test implicit in the elements of 
section 170LI must be applied in an employer neutral manner.  In other words, may the 
permissible content of a Division 2 agreement differ between the kinds of employers eligible 
to negotiate such an agreement; is permissible content for a Division 2 agreement effectively 
co-extensive with that of a Division 3 agreement?  If so, why? 
 
The answers may depend upon whether there is a legal significance in any difference that 
might seem to exist between the respective relationships of each type of employer and the 
persons employed in a single business of the employer and whose employment is subject to the 
relevant agreement.  Is a generic employer as such indistinguishably the same as an employer 
who is a constitutional corporation, the Commonwealth, a waterside employer, a flight crew 
officer’s employer, or an employer carrying on a single business in a Territory or the State of 
Victoria?  Are the persons who are employed as described indistinguishable from generic 
employees, as such?  Could it be that the elements of section 170LI define the nature of 
certified agreements to be about matters pertaining to the workplace relationship?  A 
workplace relationship is that which exists between an employer and all persons in the 
workplace, (the single business or part of the single business), subject to the agreement.  That 
is the real relationship, not an abstract employment relationship founded upon status. 
 
A question along those lines has been answered in a manner that poses it for further 
consideration and debate in relation to the recent series of decisions about payroll deduction 
of union dues or other authorised deductions25.  Any eventual answer to it may also impinge 
                                                 
24 Quickenden v Commissioner O’Connor of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2001) FCA 303 
[23 March 2001] per Black CJ and French J at paragraph 40; Carr J at paragraphs 114-115 described the laws 
as operating directly on a constitutional corporation in its day-to-day employment relationships. 
25 See Webforge Australia Pty Ltd and AMWU: PR914387, 18 February 2002 per Munro J; Re Knox City 
Council Enterprise Agreement No. 4 2001:  PR914084 per Kaufman SDP; Re Atlas Steels Metals Distribution 
Certified Agreement 2001-2003:  PR914084 per Ives DP; and Re Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd  Confectionary 
Division - NUW Enterprise Agreement 2001:  PR914087 per Ives DP. 
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upon the nature and content of subject matters that might qualify as being within the compass 
of disputes over the application of the agreement under section 170LW. 
 
That is so if only because the participation of the Commission in dispute resolution 
procedures that is authorised by section 170LW is explicitly dependent upon the content of 
the particular agreement.  The High Court in CFMEU v AIRC states that section 170LW 
operates in conjunction with an agreed dispute resolution procedure.  Literally, an agreement 
may empower the Commission to settle disputes over the application of the agreement.  In 
addition, or as an alternative, the agreement may empower the Commission to appoint a 
Board of Reference for the purpose of settling such disputes, namely disputes over the 
application of the agreement.  I am not aware of any judicial or arbitral consideration of the 
either or both phraseology of section 170LW.  Those words might be read as a limit on the 
ability of negotiating parties to authorise a role for the Commission that is not one, the other, 
or both of the options in section 170LW.  If that were to happen, it might also be thought that 
the words if the Commission so approves in section 170LW connote a substantive discretion 
that may be exercised within the scheme of conditions and considerations governing the 
certification process in Part VIB Division 4. 
 
In that respect, the function of subsection 170LT(8) also may be important.  A necessary 
condition for the certification of an agreement under Division 2 or Division 3 is that: 
 
“(8)  The agreement must include procedures for preventing and settling disputes 
between: 
 
(a)  the employer; and 
(b) the employees whose employment will be subject to the agreement; 
 
about matters arising under the agreement.” 
 
In Ampol Refineries26, a Full Bench concluded on appeal that such procedures need not be of 
a kind that guarantees the prevention and settlement of disputes.  The Bench held it would be 
sufficient compliance with the requirement if an agreement provided for a procedure based 
solely on discussion and agreement.  The Full Bench found no reason to conclude that 
arbitration is an indispensable element of the procedures referred to in subsection 170LT(8).  
It also held that the procedures described in that subsection should be construed to mean the 
                                                 
26 Ampol Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd v AIMPE Print P8620 per Giudice P, McIntyre VP and Raffaelli C; see also 
Print P6777 per Polites SDP; Re University College (UNSW) Defence Force Academy Enterprise Agreement 
1995 Print M9096 per Smith C; The ABC Case Print M3463 per Williams and Marsh DPP and Larkin C. 
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same thing as a dispute resolution procedure of the kind referred to in subsection 170VG(3), 
(embracing the model procedure prescribed for the purpose of subsection 170VG(3), and 
Schedule 9 of the Regulations and Regulation 30ZI(2), in default of an agreed provision in an 
Australian Workplace Agreement)27. 
 
That decision of course was made before CFMEU v AIRC and reached without the benefit of 
arguments opposing positions put by the appellant and the Minister intervening.  Some 
aspects of the reasoning so far as it applies to the juxtaposition of subsection 170LT(8) and 
section 170LW may need to be revisited.  It must now be accepted that agreed procedures for 
the settlement of disputes may empower the Commission to determine legal rights and 
liabilities by private arbitration between the parties who agreed the procedure.  That 
acceptance may justify or necessitate another look at the meaning of various expressions in 
the WR Act about procedures for preventing and settling disputes.  Perhaps the word 
“settlement” in section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution could have some bearing upon the 
meaning of declensions of that word in the WR Act.  That possibility, and the reasoning of the 
Court in CFMEU v AIRC could provide ice upon which to skate a proposition that the 
conjunction between discussion and agreement in section 91 of the WR Act could now be 
pregnant with meaning: 
 
“91  Commission to encourage agreement on procedures for preventing and settling 
disputes 
 
In dealing with an industrial dispute, the Commission shall, where it appears 
practicable and appropriate, encourage the parties to agree on procedures for 
preventing and settling, by discussion and agreement, further disputes between the 
parties or any of them, with a view to the agreed procedures being included in an 
award.”  (Emphasis supplied). 
 
Consideration of all those questions is unlikely to be avoided, but will not be much advanced 
by discussion in the abstract.  For present purposes, it may be worthwhile to focus upon what 
may be necessary to effectively agree to enliven section 170LW by a dispute settlement 
procedure.  An election by negotiating parties for either or both of the section 170LW options 
would not usually free the negotiating parties from the task of spelling out details of the 
procedure and the Commission’s role in it.  That point may be supported by analogy. 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid Ampol at pages 5 and 7. 
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A glance at section 131 is sufficient to demonstrate that appointment of a Board of Reference 
is not likely to be effective unless the appointer, or the agreement authorising the 
appointment, descends to details: 
 
“131  Boards of reference 
 
(1)  The Commission may, by an award, or an order made on the application of an 
organisation or person bound by an award: 
 
(a) appoint, or give power to appoint, for the purposes of the award, a board of 
reference consisting of a person or 2 or more persons; and 
(b)  assign to the board of reference the function of allowing, approving, fixing, 
determining or dealing with, in the manner and subject to the conditions specified 
in the award or order, a matter or thing that, under the award, may from time to 
time be required to be allowed, approved, fixed, determined or dealt with. 
 
(2)  The board of reference may consist of or include a Commissioner.” 
 
In Re Hegarty; Ex parte City of Salisbury28, Mason J enunciated what has since been taken to 
be a guiding principle for the effective implementation of that provision through an award.  In 
short, the thing allowed, approved, fixed, determined, or dealt with by the Board of Reference 
provides the “factum upon which the provisions of the award then operate”.  An effective 
Board of Reference provision in an award therefore identifies the matter or thing that may be 
the subject of that datum establishing process.  Several recent arbitrated Board of Reference 
provisions for awards illustrate the relative precision with which the linkage between subject 
matters, operative award provisions, Board of Reference procedure and determination is 
articulated29. 
 
In theory, there is no sound reason why a provision in a certified agreement should not be 
framed with care and precision to allow it to operate in conjunction with sections 170LW and 
131.  Much the same care and precision might seem to be appropriate in relation to the 
framing of provisions for dispute settlement procedures for purposes of paragraph 170LW(a).  
A careful framing of the procedure to stipulate the matters on which arbitration may be 
conducted, the mutual commitment to abide the determination, and the form of declaration of 
any such determination might be thought to be prudent. 
 
                                                 
28 (1981) 147 CLR 617 at 627. 
29 WAGHI v ANF, decisions PR912571 and PR914192, and order PR914193; AEU v Minister for Education 
Victoria Prints L8274 at 29; M2054 at 15-16 and Attachment A Clause 8; M3409 at 18 ff; see also the 
discussion of principles in relation to the correspondence between an arbitrated dispute settlement procedure 
and a board of reference procedure in NTEU v AHEIA Print Q0702 at 46-53. 
 Page 13 
 
However, if the agreements that I see on a regular basis are any guide, such care in the 
drafting of dispute settlement procedures empowering the Commission under section 170LW 
is relatively exceptional.  Moreover it is a matter for conjecture whether the rigour of the R v 
Hegarty template needs to be followed at all.  The principle stated in that case countenanced 
the permissible extended operation of an award around the subsequently established datum.  
For purposes of an agreement empowering the Commission under section 170LW, it seems 
there may need to be only an adequate general submission of disputes over the application of 
the agreement to determination by arbitration.  That is because the decision in CFMEU v 
AIRC did not turn upon a mere re-statement of the principles explained in R v Hegarty.  
Rather, it turns upon an acceptance that, by agreement, the parties may through section 
170LW establish a procedure for private arbitration giving rise to binding determinations of 
legal rights and liabilities in relation to disputes over the application of an agreement. 
 
It would seem to follow that provisions that submit such disputes in broad terms for 
arbitration if necessary may be sufficiently specific to empower the Commission under 
section 170LW.  However, an express, or necessarily implied stipulation in the agreed 
procedure that the parties have agreed to accept the decision of the Commission on such 
disputes as binding on them would appear to be a necessary element of any such 
submission30. 
 
Acceptance of a relatively broad approach along those lines is evidenced in the most recent 
decisions involving submission of disputes under agreements operating in conjunction with 
section 170LW.  Thus in Ansett31, Ross VP considered the terms of the particular dispute 
settlement procedure provision before him in its overall context, and characterised the nature 
of the dispute: 
 
“[25] Clause 10 of the Agreement sets down a procedure for resolving disputes between 
the parties. Clause 10 does not apply to any dispute which arises during the life of the 
Agreement but rather the scope of clause 10 is limited by the clause itself. The 
introductory words to clause 10 are in the following terms: 
 
‘Any dispute arising from this Agreement shall be determined pursuant to the 
following procedure …’ (emphasis added) 
 
[26] In my view the dispute currently before the Commission is not a dispute “arising 
from [the] Agreement”. 
                                                 
30 See paragraph 10 above. 
31 Print R8525 at paragraphs 25-35. 
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... 
[32] Clause 10 needs to be construed in the context of the Agreement as a whole 
[Metropolitan Gas Co. v Federated Gas Employees’ Industrial Union (1924) 35 CLR 
449 per Isaacs and Rich JJ at 455].  As a specific provision clause 24 would operate to 
impliedly limit the scope of the more general clause 10 [See Anthony Horden and Sons 
Ltd v The Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 
1 per Gavan Duffy CJ and Dixon J at 7; in R v Wallis; Ex parte Employers Association 
of Wool Selling Brokers (1949) 78 CLR 529 at 550 Dixon J said: “an enactment in 
affirmative words appointing a course to be followed usually may be understood as 
importing a negative, namely, that the same matter is not to be done according to some 
other course.”]. 
 
[33] In my view the claim before me seeks to change the existing classification 
structure by adding a new rate for pilots operating B747-400 aircraft. Hence the claim 
falls within the ambit of clause 24 and may only be implemented by agreement. 
 
[34] Even in the absence of clause 24 I do not think that the dispute can properly be 
said to be a dispute “arising from [the] Agreement”. No term of the Agreement is in 
dispute between the parties. The dispute is not about the application of a particular 
term. Rather it seeks to establish a new term. In my view the APA’s claim is different in 
character to that contemplated by clause 10 of the Agreement. 
 
[35] I have decided that clause 10 of the Agreement does not provide the Commission 
with jurisdiction to set an actual rate of pay for pilots operating B747-400 aircraft. This 
conclusion is based on the construction of clause 10 of the Agreement and the 
characterisation of the dispute before me as set out above.” 
 
That approach was endorsed on appeal32.  It has been adopted in several more recent first 
instance decisions33.  To similar effect, Lacy SDP in MUA v Australian Plant Services34 
observed: 
 
“[57] An important limitation on the Commission’s powers under s 170LW is the kind of 
disputes that may be subject to resolution by the Commission.  Parliament has 
authorised the Commission to exercise powers under an agreement “to settle disputes 
over the application of the agreement” and, accordingly, its powers are limited to 
disputes of that kind.  Therefore it is necessary for the Commission, in each case where 
it is asked to deal with a matter arising under the dispute settling procedure in an 
agreement, to ascertain the character of the dispute that is before it in order determine 
whether the matter is a dispute over the application of the agreement. [Qantas Airways 
Limited  v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union, Print 
T0301, [24].].  And, importantly, the character of the dispute is distinguishable from the 
orders that may be made in settlement of the dispute [ibid, [25]; see also CFMEU v 
AIRC ibid at par 36.]. 
... 
                                                 
32 Ansett Pilots Association v Ansett Australia Pty Ltd Print S1467 at paragraphs 9 and 10. 
33 MUA v Broome Port Authority PR914136 per Raffaelli C at paragraphs 25-63; CPSU v Air Services Australia 
PR903214 per Smith C at paragraphs 8, 13, 18, 62-68.   
34 PR908236 at paragraphs 57 and 61. 
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[61] In the present matter the dispute relates to the conduct of the management under 
the grievance procedure and disciplinary action taken against two employees at East 
Swanson dock.  The question is whether the agreement was applied according to its 
terms with respect to those matters. The resolution of the dispute will have no 
application beyond the narrow scope of the management and employees directly 
concerned with the incident at East Swanson dock.  The resolution of the dispute does 
not involve any variation of the terms of the agreement so as to affect other sites that 
are bound by the agreement. ...” 
 
Those propositions and passages appear to me to provide a possible answer to the question I 
posed about the continuing relevance of the notion of ambit to private arbitration pursuant to 
section 170LW.  The notion of ambit is inherent to the concept of arbitration35.  In private 
arbitration, the content for the notion is supplied by the terms of the submission in the agreed 
dispute settlement procedure, subject to the restraint that the matters submitted cannot travel 
beyond disputes over the application of the agreement, including Board of Reference matters 
or things in dispute.  On that analysis, the settlement of a dispute over the application of the 
award about a horse by a determination about a cow would probably only be available if the 
agreement not only made provisions applying to horses but included some reference to cows 
or other livestock in the dispute settlement procedure.  Justice Giudice in a recent paper 
stressed the need for clarity in the drafting of dispute resolution procedures.  He also observed 
that the High Court has smoothed the way for the exercise of powers about the application of 
collective agreements promptly and free of the jurisdictional arguments that have been 
barriers to simplicity and clarity36. 
 
However, I should not want to overstate the legal administrative simplicity of the likely 
operation of agreed dispute settlement procedures in conjunction with section 170LW.  The 
third of the propositions from CFMEU v AIRC, summarised at paragraph 12 above, imports 
the possible general law effect of a certified agreement.  As yet, that seems to be a rather 
vague province.  The effect it may have on the operation of a particular certified agreement as 
a collective agreement is not clearly delineated.  Nor can the items of content that must 
depend for their force upon general law be readily established.  Some of the more 
mystifyingly abstract and visionary provisions of certified agreements may quality in that 
respect.  Other provisions agreed might also possibly be incorporated in industrial contracts of 
employment; the gap that often exists between the agreed date from which entitlements 
commence, and the date of operation tied to date of certification by section 170LX may open 
                                                 
35 Ibid Bain v Cadbury Schweppes at 176; and footnote 4 above. 
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another field for general law effect.  Moreover, the field from which such provisions may be 
selected would seem to have been expanded by the acceptance in several recent decisions that 
an agreement may be certified with provisions that are considered by the Commission 
Member certifying the agreement to be unenforceable37. 
 
The presence in certified agreements of provisions of uncertain character and effect opens 
interesting prospects for much litigation in future.  The principles formulated by O’Toole v 
Charles David38 for testing the validity of awards can presumably be applied to the agreement 
making and certification process.  They could well prove a fecund stimulus for a revisitation 
of the privative clause in the WR Act.  That possibility will not be diminished if the belief that 
members of the Commission are bound to follow first instance decisions of any “superior 
court” prevails39. 
 
The application of the various propositions to particular cases will of course depend upon the 
terms of the particular agreement, and the nature of the subject matter of any dispute that 
arises.  Perhaps it should not be forgotten that in CFMEU v AIRC, the Court may have 
intended to encourage an industrially simplified approach when it stated that the relevant 
disputes at Gordonstone were disputes over the application of the agreement40.  But despite 
hopes that complexity will be avoided, I expect that there will be a steady growth in the 
frequency and variety of the resort to the Commission’s power to arbitrate determinations 
about matters at issue in such disputes.  About 4000 section 170LW notifications were 
recorded as lodged in calendar 200041 
 
                                                 
36 Justice Giudice:  The Industrial Relations Commission Power of Private Arbitration:  Australian Labour Law 
Association, 14 November 2001 at paragraph 22. 
37 See footnote 24 above. 
38 (1991) 171 CLR 232 at 275, 289-291. 
39 See PR914084; PR914087 referred to at footnote 25, citing Commissioner of Taxation v Salenger (1988) 19 
FCR 378 at 387-388 per French J commenting upon a decision of a senior member of the AAT sitting in the 
jurisdiction taken over from the Taxation Board of Review.  The correlation of that analysis with “the 
pragmatic considerations which demand conformity to the opinion of a court superior in the hierarchy” by the 
tribunal established under the WR Act could be a bit more labyrinthine than may have been the case for the 
successor to the Board of Review.  Part XIV of the WR Act, section 49A of the Judiciary Act and Brennan J’s 
analysis in O’Toole v Charles David at 256-269 of the essential difference between the doctrine of estoppel 
per rem judicam and the doctrine of precedent occlude an easy passage to substantiating a belief that a judicial 
opinion expressed at first instance level of any court, including the Federal Court represents law made by that 
court by which a member of the Commission, especially a Presidential Member, is bound. 
40 Ibid Gordonstone at paragraph 38. 
41 Ibid Giudice at paragraphs 23 and 27: 
 “[27] Certified agreements are now the primary determinant of wages and salaries for a very large part 
of the workforce.  In 1994 there were about 1500 applications lodged relating to agreements.  In 2001 
there were over 10,000 applications and over 7000 agreements were certified.  Increasingly parties are 
exercising their rights to private arbitration provisions in the agreements.” 
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It should not be overlooked that that power may be augmented by occasional resort in 
appropriate cases to the power vested in the Commission by paragraph 170MD(6)(a) to vary a 
certified agreement “for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty”.  North J in 
AFMEPKIU v Qantas42 on 11 May 2001, dismissed an application for a penalty under section 
178 based on breach of a certified agreement, observing that:  
 
“Certified agreement are subject to the special statutory regime of the Act.  It allows the 
Commission to impose terms on the parties in limited circumstances.  In this respect 
certified agreements differ from other contracts governed by the general law.  In the 
case of a certified agreement which has a provision which is ambiguous, the 
Commission has power to vary the agreement ‘for the purpose of removing ambiguity 
or uncertainty’:  S170MD(6)(a).  In a case such as the present an application to the 
Commission is likely to provide a more constructive resolution to the problem of 
ambiguity.  While the Court can identify the ambiguity, it cannot remove it.  The 
Commission is empowered to remove the ambiguity.”43 
 
North J’s observation points to what may be a cogent reinforcement of the Commission’s 
capacity.  In that respect, for more reasons than one, the exercise of Commission power 
pursuant to section 170LW and generally in respect of particular agreements, will need to be 
cautious and principled. 
 
There might almost be a tripartite consensus that a resourceful, suitably qualified and 
accessible adjunct to a dispute resolution process is inescapably intrinsic to any binding 
instrument declaring legal rights and duties.  The extracts from the Explanatory Memoranda 
for the 1993 and 1996 Bills, set out at footnotes 10 and 11, almost imply a degree of 
consensus about such a need.  Most of the partisan issues are about the ambit of operation, 
rather than about that need itself.  Implicit in the developments to which I have referred is a 
recognition of what has long been one of the strengths of the industrial tribunal system:  
capacity and industrial know-how being applied through informal processes to resolve 
conflicting interests44. 
 
I suspect that unfamiliarity with those strengths and the pluralist practical sources may have 
prevented policy makers from recognising that it is not always necessary to throw out the 
baby with the bathwater.  I consider that a compelling series of points were made in 1972 by 
                                                 
42 [2001] FCA 547. 
43 Ibid [2001] FCA 547 at paragraph 69. 
44 For references supporting a view that the daily tasks of industrial tribunals establish a capacity to make value 
judgments about what is fair, within a broad discretion exercised with flexibility and the application of good 
sense:  see TWU v Wagner Print K8216 at page 58 and notes pages 100 to 102. 
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Hal Wootten as the Dean of Faculty of Law at University of New South Wales.  In an 
introduction to a monograph by G.D. Woods and Paul Stein, he wrote: 
 
“... The system of compulsory arbitration which has dominated Australian labour 
relations for well over half a century was born in the embryonic predecessors of the 
Industrial Commission of New South Wales and other State industrial tribunals, before 
the Australian colonies federated into the Commonwealth in 1901.  The apparently 
modest power given to the new Commonwealth to legislate with respect to “conciliation 
and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one State” has blossomed into a major piece of machinery for 
regulating part of the economic life of Australia. 
 
In the latter half of last century English legislation seeking to enlist the participation of 
the judiciary in determining the reasonableness of railway and canal rates led 
Lord Bramwell to exclaim in the House of Lords - 
 
‘It seems to me perfectly idle, and I cannot understand how it could have been 
supposed necessary, that it should be referred to a judge to say whether an 
agreement between carriers, of whose business he knows nothing, and 
fishmongers, of whose business he equally knows nothing, is reasonable or not.’ 
 
Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway v. Brown (1883) L.R. 8 A.C. 703, 
716. 
 
For seventy years Australian judges, State and Federal, have determined the 
reasonableness of rates of wages paid by or to, not only carriers and fishmongers, but 
almost every employer and employee in the country. 
 
Although (for reasons which it is not appropriate to discuss here) their decisions do not 
always solve industrial disputes, there are large areas of industrial relations, 
particularly on less contentious topics than rates of pay, where a reasonably workable 
body of industrial regulation has been developed largely at the (jurisdictionally 
speaking) unfettered discretion of industrial judges.  They have no inhibitions about 
saying what is just and what is unjust, and what is fair and what is unfair, because this 
is their daily task. 
 
Perhaps it is this background that has given the judges of the Industrial Commission the 
courage to exercise in its full amplitude the discretion which section 88F confers on 
them, and to exercise it with a regard for the social realities.  If the legislature is 
minded to follow a similar pattern of legislative protection in relation to other problems 
- unfair practices against the consumer, for example - it has in the Industrial 
Commission a ready made tribunal. ... 
 
The great challenge however is, as with most processes in which the legal profession 
participates today, to ensure that the appropriate remedies are available to everyone 
who needs them, and that no one is excluded by lack of means.”45 
 
                                                 
45 G.D. Woods and Paul Stein “Harsh and Unconscionable Contracts of Work in New South Wales” at pages vi-
vii, The Law Book Company Limited. 
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I accept that there may be a widespread view that the counterpart unfair contracts jurisdiction, 
now found in section 106 of the current New South Wales Act, may have become over 
litigated and legally complex.  However, even if that be so, the fact only reinforces the need 
for priority to be given to fostering a tribunal system with the operative characteristics 
identified by Wooten.  But such characteristics are not self sustaining:  they are a product of 
sound institutional policies, bi-partisan support, and an acceptance that whatever excellence is 
able to be achieved is essentially a compound of the quality of the personnel and the depth of 
their experience in the role of settling disputes pertaining to workplace relations across 
Australian industries. 
